Do as I do. Don’t read them.

Apology not accepted. They are extraordinarily absorbing.

Nick. I was stressed. Apologies. I have nil military experience and would be a severe liability in service. You could quite easily creep up on me in a tank.

Reading you posts took me back to my childhood and listening to my Uncle Jack or my father’s friends talking about El Alemein, Anzio or the Russia convoys. None of them thought themselves brave, but were. All I can think is, it must be different if you were there.

I read yet more calls today for Blair to be charged with war crimes. I despair, I really do.

Now to the areas of disagreement. I don’t think it’s possible to argue that the British response to the Sadr revolt in 2004 was ‘half-hearted’ unless you want to criticise the US for their similar approach at the same time which ended up in two negotiated settlements with Sadr which evidently achieved little, judging by the behavior of his militia over the following years.

I think it’s certainly possible to criticise the force levels and political commitment in 2006-2008, but that criticism does not work against the British in isolation. The real lack of political will was on the behalf of the Iraqi government who demonstrated no willingness to confront the Shi’ite militias until 2008 and hindered British plans to do so (e.g. Operation Salamanca in 2006 and the premature ‘Charge of the Knights’ operation in spring 2008 which forestalled a similar British-Iraqi plan intended for later in the year). You might be interested to learn that US commanders had similar problems, notably over dealing with JAM in Sadr City which is why I return to that parallel.

The failure of Iraqi institutions in 2004-07 is more relevant to the failure to defeat the insurgents than western force levels in isolation, as the US discovered in their TAOR again and again in the same period until they recruited local tribal allies in the Sunni tribes (not available in Basra) and Iraqi forces began to play a more meaningful role (also not available in Basra until 2008).

Agreed. Brownie has been largely superb on this thread.

For all my disagreements with Blair over other matters, the one thing I’m overwhelmingly glad he did do is to help liberate the people of Iraq.

My father was in the RAF nearly 40 years and his biggest pay rise came under a Labour govt.

My maternal male relatives were nearly all miners, and their biggest pay rise came under the Tories.

Funny old world.

My point was that you (and I) may have more direct military experience than anybody in the Blair or Brown cabinets, but this doesn’t stop you voicing opinion of the British role in Basra which is (in my opinion) demonstrably partisan and, in terms of objective military history, ill-informed.

Well I beg to differ; I think the numbers deployed speak for themselves, our ‘teeth’ arms did well in the invasion on the Al Faw and in Basra and its environs. After that, the follow through and the Brit’s commitment was very clearly half hearted and our precipitous pull out was dictated by political imperatives, not the operational situation. I’m not sure that my case on this is partisan; I would have made the same critique had the Tories been at the helm, as I have done about the Falklands war, which almost certainly wouldn’t have happened in the first place but for the appalling and addled brained John Nott (an ex Gurkha officer) defense review of 81.

The personal military experience of politicians is a red herring and should be ignored by anybody outside the Mail or Telegraph

I agree with some qualification. I think it distinctly unhealthy that there is seemingly a disdain for military service in the present day – cabal of Lawyers – Labour party, or that the Labour party is not able to attract those who have served. I think that is a matter separate from the UK military commitment and performance together with the support it received Iraq; though of course it may be indirectly related.

I am not, nor have I ever argued that comment on matters military – especially on strategic matters – should be the preserve of those who have served. That seemed to be Larker’s silly armchair General dig.

Anyway, separate again, the shambles that has been and is UK military procurement really does need to be sorted and personally I think civilians are by far the best placed to address this.

Yet only one of these is an example of nationality A coming to the rescue of their incompetent ally, B. The different conclusions involved spring from the political context, not the military one.

Good point:

‘The problem with this argument is that Sir William added this ” “There was contradictory intelligence, so I don’t think it invalidated the point about what weapons [Saddam] had. It was more about their use. Even if they were disassembled the [chemical or biological] agents still existed.”
So the intelligence data received 10 days prior to the war confirmed that Saddam DID have WMD materials, AND that they might not be useable on the battlefield aginst Coalition forces.

it is hard to see how this intelligence could actually be regarded as anything other than a tremendous boost for those justifying and planning the invasion.”‘

QUITE!

But of course if the ‘intelligence’ fits the message, it’s A.OK to twist it and then interpret and use its ‘inevitable’ conclusions. Whereas if it’s Blair’s ‘inteligence’ – well, that’s different!