You express a most interesting form of humanitarianism. Iraq was already destroyed, long before Gulf War II through 40+ years of Baathist rule. People were fleeing in large numbers long before Gulf War I, let alone since Gulf War II, particularly the once large Jewish community that was systematically driven out, and the Kurds. Besides, who is responsible for the carnage that has continued since Saddam’s overthrowal — the Coalition that has tried to help the Iraqi people rebuild their country after decades of Baathist brutality, or the initiators and supporters of sectarian violence, like Tariq Ramadan’s late cousin, one of the al-bana boys, who blew himself up at a medical clinic in Hilla so he could commit mass murder of a hundred Shias.

http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0615/iraq.html

“This has also resulted in the 4.7 million refugees that have been created (and uncounted 100’s of thousands of dead, of course”

Can you provide your sources for those numbers. Thanks.

On JAM, I’m sure your right. But Sadr seems to be a very significant player, perhaps more than you credit.

And, again, where do you get your information? You use a lot of acronyms – what have you been reading, if its not classified?

Regards,

Inna

The ’surge’ (meaning not only an increase in troop level, but also a very welcome change in tactics), along with the application of proper COIN doctrine, accomplished a few good things, including significant security improvements. Without it, Iraq would probably continue its post-Samarra course into fragmentation and perpetual low-level ethnical warfare. It might still resume it.

Political progress has lagged, due largely to what I referred to as ‘Malik’s obduracy’ above. Still, lately there have been some hopeful developments; it is perhaps fair to say that the Iraqi parliament went from being paralyzed to being merely dysfunctional. Progress!! :). In years past the Americans had considerable influence in Iraqi politics (and made a complete mess out of it), but as I said currently political progress or lack thereof is largely in Iraqi hands, for better or worse. And to repeat myself a bit more, the greatest opportunity (and risk) in this regard will be the upcoming elections. A fair and well-run election will bring into the political process several outsiders and sweep away many of the currently underperforming insiders. A badly run or stolen election will probably push said outsiders back to insurgency, and will lead to either a resumption of the civil war or (if the GOI is strong enough) the imposition of a Dawa/SIIC/Kurdish co-dictatorship.

After the two JAM uprising, which the Americans put down, shia insurgent activity was not very significant until late 2007 (I think), when the EFP started appearing. Mind you, the Sadrists are extremely nationalistic, and are totally opposed to an American presence (its rank and file are also far more anti-iranian than, say, Badr cadres). But the dynamics are different from the sunni insurgents. First, JAM has more of a return address, or at least has arrestable public faces and some physical infrastructure. Second, they have a constituency which demands protection from AQI tender mercies and goodies from their patronage network. Thirdly, they are or were in the government.

The later point is significant. After the Najaf uprisings, the sadrists quickly realized that, while going against american firepower head-on was very efficient, martyrdom-wise, it got them nowhere. Instead, they concentrated on leveraging the Sadr name, and their nationalistic and anti-american credentials into government positions, which they used for systematic plunder and to further their sectarian agendas (local police forces and the ministry of health being the most egregious examples), and solidifying their patronage networks and/or criminal enterprises (selling sunni property, black market petrol, ‘protection’, etc.). After the Samarra bombing, they joined the escalating civil war enthusiastically, protecting shia civilians from sunni death squad, and murdering or ethnically cleansing sunni civilians.

The so-called ‘truce’ was called for several apparent reasons; it came after clashes with the Badr left dozens of dead in the holy cities. JAM was losing support even among its core supporters due to lawlessness and increasing criminal behavior. Muqtada apparently wanted to reorganize JAM and turn it into a more disciplined force. By all accounts, he failed; JAM is more heterogeneous than ever, with some parts becoming wholly-owned Qods force subsidiaries, others degenerating into pure thuggery. When the government forces (often just badr-in-uniform, especially the INP) moved in Basrah, Sadr City andeven Maysan, apparently many people were glad to be rid of JAM.
Of course bugging out to Iran didn’t enhance Muqtada’s reputation; but elements in JAM never stopped fighting the Americans.

Well, maybe that’s correct, but my understanding is that Muqtada al-Sadr and his supporters – i.e. the Medhi army, or at least elements of it – have spent most of their time and effort fighting the US and the Badr fighters (governments linked rival Shi’ites). They declared a tactical ceasefire to avoid being wiped out by the surge, but, isn’t it the case that they both have more popular support and are more physically strong than the actual Iraqi government? Could this possibly be because they are strongly against the occupation – in line with the population. And isn’t that something missing from your analysis – the occupation? Or is that of no particular significance to the situation in your view?

Incidentally, I don’t take a knee jerk, troops out now, position. Troops out now is my position, but if someone wants to make a serious case for maintaining troops in Iraq, I would consider it if underlying it were a genuine strategy for making political process in Iraq (which the surge has singularly failed to do), and the process wasn’t combined with the continual erosion of Iraqi sovereignty and the establishment of a neo-colony – which is blatantly what is actually happening in parallel with the rest of the horrors in that country. If the troops were actually there to provide stability and enable a political process (as opposed to this being an afterthought) and the US intentions were benign, I would revise my position.

AQI’s strategic goal went a bit beyond Iraq’s borders, and included inspiring an afghan-style jihad to expel the Americans (thus making them useful allies to the sunni nationalists), and turning the sunni parts of Iraq into a safe haven or proto-caliphate (which its erstwhile local allies were less keen on). AQI nearly succeeded when the Samarra bombing and other atrocities deliberately ignited a bloody ethnic war that nearly destroyed (or finished destroying) the country. Eventually, however, it lost too. Significantly, its defeat is due in large measure to the rejection, in Anbar and elsewhere, of its ideology by what was supposed to be its core constituency: conservative Sunni Arabs under American occupation.

The closest thing to a shia insurgency was the heterogeneous Mehdi army. Most of it spent most of its time either ethnically cleansing sunnis or running various criminal enterprises, rather than fighting the US. Up until a few months ago, its position seemed secure; but the GOI has (surprisingly) taken them head-on (more for the benefit of the other shia parties (Dawa and the SIIC) than for abstract republican ideals, I’m afraid). The JAM is not beaten, but it has taken a beating. Unlike AQI, however, it still retains substantial popular support.

Insurgent attacks will probably continue for a long time (albeit at a much lower rate than before); but strategically the insurgency itself is no longer very significant.

The most important dynamic in Iraq today is not the fight between Americans and Insurgents. It hasn’t been for a long time. For a while it was the Sunni vs. Shia conflict (with a bit of Kurd vs. Arab). Although the latter dynamic remains significant, to me it seems that it is the clash between the parties currently ‘inside’ (SIIC, Dawa, the Kurdish groups, the parliment sunnis) and those totally or partially outside (the awakenings, the various flavors of sadrists, etc) that is the most significant. How this tension is resolved will largely determine whether Iraq will move toward a decent outcome or return to civil war.

For the decent outcome to happen, it is necessary that the outsiders be given enough of a stake, both in terms of government services (or, more realistically, patronage), and of political participation.
In that regard, the obduracy of the Malik government (by dragging his feet on the hiring of sunnis, or in providing them with governmental services) is probably one of the most worrisome (and intractable) problems in Iraq today.This is compounded by widespread corruption, and the absence of a competent civil service or a functioning civil society.

In the same vein, cracking down on the Sadrists is fine, even if the motives for such are less than noble; but to exclude them altogether (or to impose hurdles so severe they are effectively excluded) risks disenfranchising a large contingent of poor shia. In fact what Iraq needs more than almost anything else is an effective non-sectarian opposition. Such opposition would give voice and a measure of power to groups not currently represented in the ruling coalition, and would provide an incentive for the government du jour to at least try to do a competent job. There is evidence one such group might emerge, comprising Allawi’s secularists, some sadrists, Jaffari’s Dawa splinter, and other odds and ends. But currently the insiders are far better organized.

Much will depend on the manner in which the upcoming provincial, and later national, elections are conducted. If popular groups or individuals are excluded, or if there is significant vote rigging or voter intimidation, the sadrists and the various awakening/SOI/etc groups will probably abandon the political process altogether.

In all of this, there is plenty the Americans (or, for that matter, the Iranians, should they be so inclined) can do (or refrain from doing) to improve the odds of a decent outcome; but the future of Iraq now lies increasingly on Iraqi hands.